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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of 
equitable relief for mistake in SCI Minnesota Funeral Services, Inc. v. 
Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp. (SCI).1  SCI involved a stock sale 
agreement—a contract for the sale of a business in corporate 
form.2  Both parties to the agreement, the buyer and seller, were 
mistaken about the exact mix of assets that were titled to the 
corporation being sold.3  When this mistake was discovered after 
the sale was complete, the seller sought equitable relief to regain 
title to the particular assets about which the parties were mistaken.4 
The framework that courts in the United States have adopted 
to resolve when mistakes give rise to equitable relief is historically 
rooted in medieval England.5  Notwithstanding this ancient 
heritage, the doctrine of equitable relief for mistake has long 
suffered from specious judicial articulation6 and inconsistent 
application.7  Generally, equitable relief for a mistake that taints a 
 
 1. 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 858. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 859. 
 5. See infra note 23. 
 6. See infra note 41. 
 7. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.  Courts have struggled much 
more broadly to properly apply their equitable powers.  The evolution of the 
federal courts’ application of equitable doctrines to cases and controversies 
involving the federal tax laws provides an excellent display of this struggle.  
Throughout history, equitable powers were used to shield aggrieved people by 
providing relief where the law inflicted an unjust result.  Historically, equitable 
powers were never used as a sword against the people.  Since 1935, however, the 
federal courts have turned this venerable history of equitable jurisdiction on its 
head.  Despite the Solomonic import of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s 
famous statement in Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 
(1920), that when complying with the federal tax laws, taxpayers must “turn square 
corners,” federal courts have used various equitable powers to inflict liability on 
taxpayers who turned these corners at perfect right angles.  The reason for this 
frightening change to the historic application of equitable powers is, no doubt, 
subject to considerable differences of political opinion.  Whatever may be the true 
motives of federal courts for using their powers of equitable jurisdiction as a 
sword, it is clear that taxpayers, notwithstanding their having turned “square 
2
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contractual agreement takes shape through the judicial 
reformation or rescission of that agreement.8  The idea is that 
equitable relief, “such as is required by the circumstances, may be 
granted from the consequences of a mistake of any fact which is a 
material element of the transaction . . . if there be no adequate 
remedy at law.”9  As a result, Minnesota courts may either rescind 
an agreement tainted with mistake or reform it so that the 
agreement conforms to the objectively manifested intentions of the 
parties.10 
Yet questions remain as to how far into the form of an 
agreement a Minnesota court will cast its gaze in search of mistakes 
for which relief will be granted.  In particular, there is the question 
of whether a Minnesota court will look through the corporate form 
when determining whether to exercise equitable powers and 
provide relief for mistakes about the particular composition of 
assets and liabilities of a business in corporate form whose stock is 
being sold. 
As historically formulated in Minnesota, “[e]quity’s vision is 
not circumscribed by formal instruments, but extends through 
matters of form to the heart of the transaction.”11  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision in SCI, however, strongly suggests that no 
type of equitable relief will ever reach through the corporate form 
to remedy mutual mistakes about the assets and liabilities of a 
corporation—no matter what longstanding judicial principles of 
equity have to say. 
This note first examines the history of and policies underlying 
equitable remedies, including the types of mistakes for which 
courts will provide equitable relief.12  It then details the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s holding in SCI, including the supreme court’s 
 
corners” in good faith, have been made to bear tax liabilities at the hands of 
federal courts applying such (formerly) equitable doctrines as “substance over 
form,” “economic substance,” “sham transaction,” and “step transaction.”  See, e.g., 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Coltec Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 
(2007); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d on other grounds in part, vacated in part as moot, 598 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
For a comprehensive articulation about how federal courts have turned equitable 
jurisdiction on its head when dealing with the federal tax laws, see JASPER L. 
CUMMINGS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT’S FEDERAL TAX JURISPRUDENCE 171–89 (2010). 
 8. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 9. Thwing v. Hall & Ducey Lumber Co., 40 Minn. 184, 187, 41 N.W. 815, 816 
(1889). 
 10. See infra notes 48, 53 and accompanying text. 
 11. Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 267, 139 N.W. 493, 495 (1913). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
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express refusal to extend the bright-line and form-focused 
reasoning of prior case law on rescission to the reformation of 
stock sale agreements.13  An analysis of the SCI decision follows the 
description of the case.14  This analysis argues that the supreme 
court’s express refusal in SCI to extend to reformation the bright-
line and form-focused reasoning of prior case law on rescission is 
directly contradictory to the reasoning the court ultimately adopted 
to deny the equitable remedy of reformation.  Finally, this note 
concludes that the supreme court’s apparent distaste for looking 
through the form—the corporate form—of the stock sale in SCI is 
at odds with longstanding judicial principles of equity, effectively 
foreclosing any type of meaningful equitable relief for stock sales 
tainted with mutual mistake where no fraud or inequitable conduct 
is involved.15 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Historical Development of Equitable Remedies 
Courts and judges have often strayed from strict adherence to 
the so-called “black letter law” and have provided aggrieved parties 
with relief based on the intent of the law and on a sense of justice.16  
This judicial adaptability is called “equity” or equitable relief.17  
Courts and judges have exercised these equitable powers, also 
called equitable jurisdiction, for thousands of years.18  For instance, 
magistrates, or praetors, provided equitable relief to ancient 
Romans.19  After the Roman Empire collapsed, the courts in much 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61–62 (citation omitted) 
(“From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we call 
equity; which is thus defined by Grotius, ‘the correction of that, wherein the law (by 
reason of its universality) is deficient.’ . . . [A]s Grotius expresses it, ‘lex non exacte 
definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit.’  [The law does not define exactly, but leaves 
something to the discretion of a just and wise judge.]”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *49–50.  Lord Henry Home Kames, in 
his seminal work Principles of Equity, suggests that the ancient exercise of equitable 
powers is illustrated in the Biblical story of Moses and the Israelites.  LORD HENRY 
HOME KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 n.(a) (1825) (citing Exodus 18:25-26). 
 19. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *49 (footnotes omitted) (“This distinction 
between law and equity, . . . was perfectly familiar to the Romans; . . . but the 
power of both centered in one and the same magistrate, who was equally intrusted 
[sic] to pronounce the rule of law, and to apply it to particular cases by the 
principles of equity.”); see also KAMES, supra note 18, at 13. 
4
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of continental Europe carried on the exercise of equitable powers 
in the Roman tradition.20  The development of equity in England,21 
however, is most pertinent to the development of equity in the 
United States because, upon statehood, colonial American courts 
adopted much of the same equitable jurisdiction as that exercised 
by the English Court of Chancery.22 
The English Court of Chancery was presided over by the Office 
of the Chancellor.23  The Lord Chancellor, an officer of the King of 
England, was delegated “a very considerable portion of the royal 
prerogative authority pertaining to the administration of justice.”24  
This authority allowed the Chancellor to ameliorate “the rigor of 
the common law, in all cases in which natural justice, equity and 
 
 20. A. H. MARSH, HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY AND OF THE RISE AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITY 13 (1890) (“[W]hen the modern 
Kingdoms of Europe were established upon the ruins of the [Roman] [E]mpire 
almost every state preserved its Chancellor, with different jurisdictions and 
dignities according to their different constitutions.”); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 16, at *49 n.a (citation omitted) (“Thus too the parliament of Paris, the court 
of session in Scotland, and every other jurisdiction in Europe of which we have any 
tolerable account, found all their decisions as well upon principles of equity as 
those of positive law.”). 
 21. KAMES, supra note 18, at 4 (“The establishment of the court of chancery in 
England, made it necessary to give a name to the more ordinary branch of law, 
that is, the province of the common or ordinary courts; it is termed, the Common 
Law, and in opposition to it, the extraordinary branch devolved on the court of 
chancery it termed Equity . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 669 
A.2d 36, 39 (Del. 1995) (stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery “has only 
that limited jurisdiction that the Court of Chancery in England possessed at the 
time of the American Revolution, or such jurisdiction as has been conferred upon 
it by the Delaware General Assembly”); Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. 323, 327 (1853) 
(“Equity Jurisprudence generally embraces the same matters of jurisdiction and 
modes of remedy, as exist in England.”); Amelung v. Seekamp, 9 G. & J. 468, 468 
(Md. 1838) (“The principles and powers of the court of chancery in England, at 
the time of the revolution, not altered by our legislation, nor inapplicable to our 
political institutions, are the same by which the court of chancery of Maryland is 
governed.”); Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 507, 527 (1827) (stating 
that Massachusetts courts have “all the authority and power which is enjoyed or 
exercised by tribunals which entertain [equitable] jurisdiction in England”); Wells 
v. Pierce, 27 N.H. 503, 512 (1853) (noting that the courts of New Hampshire 
exercise jurisdiction “coextensive with those of the court of chancery, and other 
courts of equity in England”); Mattison v. Mattison, 20 S.C. Eq. (1 Strob. Eq.) 387, 
388 (1847) (noting that the equitable powers of the Court of Appeals of Equity of 
South Carolina was “confined to cases of Chancery cognizance in Great Britain”). 
 23. See MARSH, supra note 20, at 13–15.  According to Marsh, the English 
Court of Chancery was officially recognized through an act of King Edward III in 
the mid-fourteenth century as a regular English court with jurisdiction over 
matters of “grace.”  Id. at 29–30.  Prior to this official recognition, the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Chancery was broader, and mixed with the common law.  Id. at 17. 
 24. Id. at 14. 
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good conscience required his intervention.”25  In this way, the 
powers of the Court of Chancery were lenitive to the powers of the 
English courts of common law—courts whose authority was strictly 
limited to providing remedies created by some positive English law, 
such as a writ or a statute.26 
B. The Purpose and Scope of Equitable Remedies 
It is evident, then, that equitable remedies were founded in a 
sense of justice, where adherence to the black letter law created a 
result believed to be unjust or inconsistent with the intent of the 
law’s maker.27  In order to reach this type of justice, equitable 
remedies were compelled to develop unhindered by formalities 
because they were intended to address the substance of the 
circumstances of particular cases.28  Given the broad nullifying 
effects that sweeping judicial exercises of equitable powers could 
have on the black letter law, however, courts established rules 
limiting their use of equitable remedies to particular judicially 
defined circumstances.29  One such circumstance is the occasion 
where a written contractual agreement does not reflect the 
objectively manifested intentions of the parties to that agreement.30  
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 30. 
 27. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *429 (“Equity then, in it’s [sic] true and 
genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all law: positive law is construed, and 
rational law is made, by it.  In this, equity is synonymous to justice; in that, to the 
true sense and sound interpretation of the rule.”) 
 28. 1 GEORGE SPENSE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 
390 (1846) (“In the Court of Chancery, no writ or formula imposed any fetter of 
form; and the court not being tied to forms, was able to modify the relief given by 
its decrees to answer all the particular exigencies of the case fully and 
circumstantially . . . .”). 
 29. See KAMES, supra note 18, at 13 (“To determine every particular case, 
according to what is just, equal, and salutary, taking in all circumstances, is 
undoubtedly the idea of a court of equity in its perfection; and had we angels for 
judges, such would be their method of proceeding, without regarding any rules . . 
. but men are liable to prejudice and error, and for that reason, cannot safely be 
trusted with unlimited powers.  Hence, the necessity of establishing rules, to 
preserve uniformity of judgment in matters of equity as well as of common law . . . 
the necessity is perhaps greater in the former, because of the variety and intricacy 
of equitable circumstances.”); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *62 (“[T]he 
liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, 
lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in 
the breast of the judge.”). 
 30. KAMES, supra note 18, at 132–33 (“In applying the rules of equity to . . . 
covenants, what comes first under consideration is, whether the [intent of the 
parties] will be fully or fairly taken down in the writing. . . . The sole purpose of 
the writing is to bear testimony of [the intent of the parties]; and if that testimony 
6
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Though the common law adhered strictly to the words used in the 
parties’ written agreement, some form of equitable relief might be 
attained by looking beyond the written words and ascertaining the 
intentions of the parties.31  English courts, as well as courts in the 
United States, began providing equitable relief in these situations 
because people often express their intentions with words used 
imprecisely and out of context.32  Not every failure of a written 
agreement to express the intentions of the parties will be afforded 
equitable relief, however.33  Failures qualifying for relief must be 
rooted in particular judicially recognized grounds, such as that of 
mistake.34 
C. Mistake as a Ground for Equitable Relief 
“From the time when jurisdiction was first formally delegated 
to the Chancellor [of England] by the crown, mistake has played a 
most important part [in] . . . the exercise of the jurisdiction in 
awarding equitable remedies.”35 
Mistake has long been used by courts exercising their 
equitable powers, both in England and in the United States, as a 
ground to reform or rescind contractual agreements.36  Even 
 
prove erroneous, it can avail nothing against the truth. . . . [E]quitable jurisdiction 
. . . declares for [the intent of the parties] against every erroneous evidence of 
it.”). 
 31. Id. at 132 (“[I]n common law, the words are strictly adhered to, [but] 
such imperfections are remedied by a court of equity. [Equity] admits words and 
writings to be the proper evidence of will; but excludes not other evidence.”). 
 32. Id. at 132–33 (“[C]lauses in writings are sometimes ambiguous or 
obscure, sometimes too limited, sometimes too extensive. . . . Sensible that words 
and writing are not always accurate, [equitable jurisdiction] endeavors to reach 
will . . . however it may differ from the words.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Minn. 1982) (“The 
general rule is that a court may order an agreement rescinded if both parties were 
mistaken with respect to facts material to the agreement.”); Nichols v. Shelard 
Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980) (discussing three elements 
necessary for reformation of written instruments). 
 34. KAMES, supra note 18, at 179 (“[E]quity will afford relief against . . . 
error.”). 
 35. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 838 
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (citations omitted). 
 36. Id.; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 152 (Isaac F. Redfield ed., 10th ed. 1870) 
(“One of the most common classes of cases, in which relief is sought in equity, on 
account of a mistake of facts, is that of written agreements, either executory or 
executed.  Sometimes by mistake, the written agreement contains less than the 
parties intended; sometimes it contains more; and sometimes it simply varies from 
their intent by expressing something different in substance from the truth of that 
intent.  In all such cases if the mistake is clearly made out by proofs entirely 
7
Johnson: Contracts: There Can Be No Mistake—A Call for the Reformation of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
2011] THERE CAN BE NO MISTAKE 467 
before Minnesota’s statehood,37 in fact, Minnesota courts exercised 
equitable jurisdiction to reform or rescind contractual agreements 
tainted with mistake.38 
It is not every type of mistake that will give rise to equitable 
relief, however.39  Composing an accurate and practical definition 
of exactly which types of mistakes are sufficient to justify equitable 
relief has troubled courts since the doctrine of relief for mistake 
first emerged.40  In fact, courts have developed various and 
sometimes disparate theories that attempt to explain which 
mistakes equity will relieve.41  Adding to this judicial fray are cases 
of mistake involving similar fact patterns, which have been decided 
in different ways by courts in different jurisdictions.42 
Generally speaking, a mistake is “that result of ignorance of 
law or of fact which has misled a person to commit that which, if he 
had not been in error, he would not have done.”43  Absent fraud or 
inequitable conduct, all parties must be mistaken about the same 
subject matter in order to obtain equitable relief.44  Additionally, 
the types of mistakes which may be relieved through reformation 
are different from those which may be relieved through 
 
satisfactory, equity will reform the contract, so as to make it conformable to the 
precise intent of the parties.  But if the proofs are doubtful and unsatisfactory, and 
the mistake is not made entirely plain, equity will withhold relief; upon the 
ground, that the written paper ought to be treated as a full and correct expression 
of the intent, until the contrary is established beyond reasonable controversy.”). 
 37. See Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 463, 68 N.W.2d 376, 381–82 (1955).  
The district courts of the territory of Minnesota “were initially vested with, and 
exercised, full chancery powers. . . . The territorial act of 1853, abolishing separate 
chancery courts and vesting all equity powers in the law courts, did not impair the 
court’s inherent equitable powers.”  Id. (citing Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298, 302 
(1860)).  The Minnesota State Constitution has preserved this equitable 
jurisdiction in Minnesota district courts.  See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; Swogger, 243 
Minn. at 463, 68 N.W.2d at 382. 
 38. Buckley v. Patterson, 39 Minn. 250, 252, 39 N.W. 490, 491 (1888) (“It is 
well established that a party can be relieved of a contract, founded in his mistake . 
. . . And this may be done . . . in an action to correct or cancel.” (citing Benson v. 
Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 33 N.W. 38 (1887))). 
 39. See 27 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:125 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.). 
 40. See, e.g., Kowalke v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 79 N.W. 762, 763 
(Wis. 1899) (“Indeed, no definition or general rule has been invented which is 
sufficient or accurate, except by immediately surrounding it with numerous 
exceptions and qualifications more important than itself.”). 
 41. See Note, Rescission of a Contract for a Mutual Mistake of Fact, 35 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 758 (1922). 
 42. See Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., Mistake of Fact as a Ground for Affirmative Equitable 
Relief, 23 HARV. L. REV. 608, 609–10 (1910). 
 43. 1 STORY, supra note 36, § 110 n.1. 
 44. See Blancharel v. Patterson, 64 Minn. 454, 456, 67 N.W. 356, 357 (1896). 
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rescission.45 
In order to support the reformation of a written contractual 
agreement, a mistake must be made in reducing the parties’ 
agreement to writing.46  In Minnesota, a party seeking the 
reformation of a written agreement for mistake must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that three specific elements are satisfied.47  
First, the party must show that there was a valid agreement between 
the parties and that this agreement objectively expressed the 
parties’ intentions.48  Next, the party seeking reformation must 
show that the written agreement fails to reflect the parties’ actual 
agreement.49  Finally, the party seeking reformation must show that 
this failure was due either to a mutual mistake of the parties to the 
agreement or to a mistake of one party accompanied by the 
fraudulent or inequitable conduct of the other party.50 
To support rescission, a mistake must be mutual and must go 
to the essence of the subject matter material to the transaction.51  
In Minnesota, a party seeking rescission of a written contractual 
agreement for mutual mistake must show that, at the time of the 
parties’ agreement, both parties were mistaken about facts material 
to the agreement.52  Additionally, the party seeking rescission 
cannot bear the risk of the mistake.53 
 
 
 45. See Abbot, supra note 42, at 609–10. 
 46. Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 353, 205 
N.W.2d 121, 124 (1973). 
 47. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980); see also 
Blancharel, 64 Minn. at 456, 67 N.W. at 357. 
 48. Nichols, 294 N.W.2d at 734. 
 49. Id.  The failure must arise either through a scrivener’s error or through 
the failure of the parties’ agreed-upon language to reflect their actual intent.  See 
Segerstrom v. Holland Piano Mfg. Co., 155 Minn. 50, 52, 192 N.W. 191, 192 
(1923).  There is no requirement that the written agreement be ambiguous.  Metro 
Office Parks, 295 Minn. at 353, 205 N.W.2d at 124. 
 50. Nichols, 294 N.W.2d at 734. 
 51. See Gartner v. Eikill, 319 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. 1982); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981) (“Where a mistake of both 
parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, 
the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of 
the mistake . . . .”). 
 52. Winter v. Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Minn. 1987); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981).  A fact is material if it goes 
to the central nature of the transaction.  Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 399. 
 53. Winter, 404 N.W.2d at 793 (citing Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 398–99); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981). 
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D. Equitable Relief in Minnesota for Mistakes in Stock Sale Agreements 
In the 1919 case of Costello v. Sykes,54 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the bright-line and form-focused rule that stock sale 
agreements tainted by mistake may not be rescinded absent fraud 
or inequitable conduct.55  Costello involved the sale of the stock of a 
bank from which bank employees had embezzled large sums.56  The 
bank’s accounting books and records portrayed the bank as having 
a book value of $136 per share.57  Due to the enormity of the 
employees’ defalcations, however, the bank actually had a book 
value of only $60 per share.58  Apparently, neither the purchaser 
nor the seller of the bank stock knew about the embezzlement.59  
The supreme court ruled that the stock sale agreement in Costello 
was not tainted by mistake because the buyer got exactly that for 
which he had bargained: the bank stock.60  The supreme court 
followed the bright-line and form-focused reasoning from an old 
English case61 in setting out the rule that when the sale of corporate 
stock is the subject matter of a written agreement, any mutual 
mistake about the corporation’s assets and liabilities will not give 
rise to rescission absent fraud, concealment of facts, or a mistake as 
to the identity of the stock.62  Exactly what rule applies in 
Minnesota to give rise to the reformation of stock sale agreements 
for mutual mistakes about corporate assets and liabilities had to 
wait for SCI. 
III. THE SCI DECISION 
SCI Minnesota Funeral Services, Inc. (“SCI”) owned 
cemeteries and funeral home businesses with and through its 
corporate subsidiaries, including the Crystal Lake Cemetery 
Association (“Crystal Lake”).63  Crystal Lake owned three 
cemeteries and funeral home businesses, all located in Minnesota.64  
 
 54. 143 Minn. 109, 172 N.W. 907 (1919). 
 55. Id. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909. 
 56. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 112, 172 N.W. at 908. 
 61. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908 (citing Kennedy v. Pan., N.Z., & Austl. Royal 
Mail Co., [1867] 2 L.R.Q.B. 580 (Eng.)). 
 62. Id. at 111, 114, 172 N.W. at 908–09. 
 63. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 2011). 
 64. Id.  The three cemetery and funeral home businesses were the Crystal 
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Early in 2005, SCI began seeking buyers for several of its businesses, 
including the businesses held by Crystal Lake.65  On April 1, 2005, 
SCI executed a letter of intent with Corinthian Enterprises, LLC 
(“Corinthian”) for the sale of several businesses.66  On July 20, 
2005, SCI sold to Corinthian the several businesses, including those 
held by Crystal Lake,67 in part under an asset purchase agreement 
and in part under a stock purchase agreement.68  Crystal Lake was 
sold pursuant to the stock purchase agreement because SCI and 
Corinthian believed that Minnesota law prohibited the direct asset 
acquisition of cemeteries operated for profit.69  Corinthian paid $1 
million for the Crystal Lake stock.70  On the very same day it made 
this purchase, Corinthian turned around and sold to Washburn-
McReavy Funeral Corporation (“Washburn”) most of the assets and 
all of the Crystal Lake stock that it had purchased from SCI.71  
 
Lake Cemetery/Crematory in the city of Minneapolis, Dawn Valley Funeral 
Home/Memorial Park in the city of Bloomington, and Glen Haven Memorial 
Gardens in the city of Crystal.  Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs. Inc., v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No. 
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009), aff’d, 779 
N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  The supreme court noted that the Crystal Lake stock purchase was 
treated by the parties thereto as an asset sale for tax purposes.  SCI Minn. Funeral 
Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858.  This means that the parties made an election, provided 
for by Internal Revenue Code § 338(h)(10), to treat the stock sale as an asset sale 
for federal income tax purposes.  This election must be made jointly by both 
parties.  It is designed to allow the buyer to purchase shares of the target business 
and yet apply the purchase price (and assumed liabilities) to “step up” the tax 
basis of the target business’s assets.  This treatment can benefit the buyer by 
increasing the buyer’s near-term tax depreciation and amortization deductions.  
The parties are both required to report information regarding the § 338(h)(10) 
election, including the aggregate fair value of the assets transferred, to the 
Internal Revenue Service.  See MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS, 
ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ¶ 206 (2011).  Presumably, both SCI (or SCI’s 
ultimate parent) and Washburn-McReavy failed to report any fair value for the two 
vacant properties which they had not intended to transfer.  Subsequently, and 
notwithstanding the stipulation of both parties that they did not know the two 
properties were titled to Crystal Lake, additional evidence that the parties’ actual 
agreement did not include the two valuable properties is likely to lie within each 
party’s federal income tax return(s) that covered the year of the transaction. 
 69. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858.  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court suggests that this conclusion might have been in error.  See id.  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, on the other hand, appears to have regarded the 
parties’ conclusion as true.  See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-
McReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d 865, 868, 871 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 70. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858. 
 71. Brief & Appendix of Respondents at 12–13, SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. 
v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855 (No. A09-935). 
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Corinthian sold the Crystal Lake stock to Washburn for $1 million 
by assigning to Washburn all rights under the stock purchase 
agreement that Corinthian had just executed with SCI.72 
The Crystal Lake stock sale agreement between SCI and 
Corinthian—the same agreement Corinthian later sold and 
assigned to Washburn—specifically listed the three Minnesota 
cemetery properties held by Crystal Lake which were to be sold.73  
Unbeknownst to SCI, Corinthian, or Washburn, Crystal Lake also 
held title to two vacant properties at the time of the stock sale, one 
in Minnesota and another in Colorado.74  At the time SCI sold the 
Crystal Lake stock, these properties were worth approximately $2 
million,75 twice the amount paid to SCI for the Crystal Lake stock.  
Yet, they were not listed alongside the Minnesota cemetery 
properties in the Crystal Lake stock sale agreement.76  In fact, none 
of the parties intended the transfer of these two properties in the 
Crystal Lake stock sale.77 
At some point after the Crystal Lake stock sale was complete, 
SCI, believing that it still owned the two vacant properties, 
conducted title searches and discovered to its chagrin that Crystal 
Lake actually held title to both properties.78  SCI contacted 
Washburn, which was, as yet, apparently unaware that Crystal Lake 
held title to the properties, and requested that Washburn quitclaim 
the properties back to SCI.79  Washburn refused.80 
SCI then sued Washburn to recover the two properties, 
seeking the reformation or, alternatively, the rescission of the 
Crystal Lake stock sale agreement.81  The Minnesota District Court, 
 
 72. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858.  Washburn paid $6.5 million 
in total for all the assets and the Crystal Lake stock.  Brief & Appendix of 
Respondents at 12–13, SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy 
Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855 (No. A09-935). 
 73. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 858. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 858–59.  The court of appeals noted that the “stock-sale agreement 
between SCI and Corinthian provides for ‘[l]egal descriptions of all real property 
owned or leased by’ Crystal Lake, and the descriptions therein do not include the 
Burnsville and Colorado parcels.”  SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-
McReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis 
added) (quoting the stock sale agreement), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011). 
 77. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859. 
 78. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 869. 
 79. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859. 
 80. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 869. 
 81. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859.  Both SCI and Corinthian 
sued Washburn.  For all practical purposes, however, SCI was the party truly 
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in summary judgment, held that SCI was not entitled to relief 
through either reformation or rescission.82  The district court 
concluded that reformation was not available for the stock sale 
agreement by analyzing the reformation claim under the 
traditional elements required by Minnesota case law.83  Then, citing 
Costello as precedent, the district court held that rescission was also 
not available to SCI for the stock sale agreement because “[u]nder 
Minnesota law, the stock sale of a corporation transfers all of the 
assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.”84  A divided court 
of appeals affirmed but went further than the district court and 
extended the bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello to the 
reformation of stock sale agreements.85  SCI appealed these losses 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court.86 
In SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in 
Costello, reasoning that a mutual mistake about a corporation’s 
assets and liabilities is not “‘of such a character as to give rise to a 
right to rescind,’”87 as long as the “‘means of information are open 
alike to both and there is no concealment of facts or imposition.’”88  
Such a mistake, the court stated, “is one of value.”89  The supreme 
court also affirmed the district court’s reasoning under Costello that 
“[u]nder Minnesota law, the stock sale of a corporation transfers all of 
the assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.”90  Once the court 
reaffirmed these rules from Costello, it stated simply that “Costello 
bars rescission in this case.”91 
 
interested in obtaining equitable relief.  This article will reflect this state of affairs 
by merely referring to SCI as the party in suit seeking relief. 
 82. Id. 
 83. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No. 
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879, at *A.9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009), aff’d, 
779 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 864. 
 86. Id. at 859. 
 87. Id. at 862 (quoting Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 
908 (1919)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Costello, 143 Minn. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909). 
 89. Id. 
 90. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., No. 
19HA-CV-08-1902, 2009 WL 6371879 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2009) (emphasis 
added), aff’d, 779 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 
2011); see SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 859 (affirming the district court’s 
decision that SCI was “not entitled to rescission based on mutual mistake because a 
stock sale transfers all assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded” (emphasis 
added)). 
 91. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 862.  SCI argued that Costello 
should be overruled in the face of contrary case law from other jurisdictions, such 
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When it came to reformation for mutual mistake, however, the 
supreme court began by expressly disavowing the bright-line and 
form-focused rule from Costello, apparently summarily overruling 
the court of appeals’ extension of Costello to the reformation of 
stock sale agreements.92  The supreme court then recalled its 
precedent for prima facie cases of reformation, concluding that 
this precedent should still apply in the context of stock sale 
agreements.93  In applying this precedent, however, the supreme 
court produced essentially the same bright-line and form-focused 
analysis as in Costello to bar any equitable relief for stock sale 
agreements.94  Instead of relying upon Costello’s rule that a court 
will not look within the corporate form for mutual mistake in a 
stock sale agreement, the supreme court reasoned in SCI that there 
was no mutual mistake supporting relief through reformation 
because “under Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers 
 
as Clayburg v. Whitt, 171 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1969).  Id. at 863.  Clayburg “rejected 
‘the proposition that the existence or non-existence of corporate assets is 
immaterial[,]’” holding “‘it was proper for the court to look beyond the form of 
the asset transferred (corporate stock) to the substance of the transfer (corporate 
assets and liabilities) in deciding whether there was a mutual mistake such as 
would justify refusing enforcement or rescission of the contract.’”  Id. (quoting 
Clayburg, 171 N.W.2d at 626).  The court in SCI responded that it would not 
overrule its precedent (Costello) unless it was “‘contrary to principles of equity, 
[was] at odds with some of our statements in’ other cases and did not promote 
good public policy.”  Id. at 863 n.5 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784 
N.W.2d 341, 352–54 (Minn. 2010)). 
 92. Id. at 865 (“When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the 
additional analysis from Costello . . . applies. But we have never used that additional 
analysis in the reformation context, where the relief does not seek to unwind the 
transaction but simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention. We 
likewise decline to do so here.” (citation omitted)). 
 93. Id. (“A party seeking reformation must prove that: ‘(1) there was a valid 
agreement between the parties expressing their real intentions; (2) the written 
instrument failed to express the real intentions of the parties; and (3) this failure 
was due to a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake accompanied by 
fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.’” (quoting Nichols v. Shelard 
Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980))). 
 94. Regarding the equitable rescission of stock sale agreements for mutual 
mistake, the supreme court found the rule from Costello to be that “a sale of 
corporate stock may not be ‘rescinded merely because both parties were mistaken 
about the nature or extent of the assets or liabilities of the corporation’ as long as 
the ‘means of information are open alike to both and there is no concealment of 
facts or imposition.’”  Id. at 862 (quoting Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 114, 172 
N.W. 907, 909 (1919)).  Regarding the equitable reformation of stock sale 
agreements for mutual mistake, the court noted, “‘When a business is sold 
through a stock transfer, the buyer assumes not only the assets of the corporation, 
but also the liabilities.  This greater risk justifies greater protection for the stock 
purchaser.’”  Id. at 866 (quoting Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 
536 (Minn. 1986)). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/3
474 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
all of its stock, it is selling all of its assets and liabilities, unless the 
business has expressed otherwise.”95  The supreme court then 
proceeded to explain that principles of Minnesota agency law, as 
applied to a corporation under Minnesota corporate law, 
constructively imputed knowledge of the two vacant properties to 
SCI.96  This imputation, the court concluded, caused any mistake 
about the two properties to be, “as a matter of law,” a unilateral 
mistake—a mistake that does not qualify for relief through 
reformation.97 
Even though the supreme court found that SCI and Washburn 
agreed on all material facts at the time of the lawsuit,98 were both 
unaware that Crystal Lake held title to the two vacant properties at 
the time of the sale,99 and did not intend to include those 
properties in the sale,100 the court refused to look beyond the form 
of the stock sale when determining whether to exercise its 
equitable powers for a mutual mistake.101  Accordingly, the 
supreme court’s unanimous holding in SCI is that the parties to a 
stock sale agreement cannot, as a matter of law, obtain equitable 
relief through reformation for a mutual mistake about corporate 
assets and liabilities in the absence of fraud or inequitable 
conduct.102  In essence, SCI rules that if parties engage in the 
transfer of a business through a stock sale, the form of the sale 
controls to bar equitable relief for mutual mistake because the 
court will not look through the corporate form to the substance of 
what the parties intended to transfer in the sale. 
 
 95. Id. at 866. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 858. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 859. 
 101. Id. at 867 (“[T]he undisputed evidence establishes that appellants cannot 
prove that the stock sale agreement failed to express the true intentions of the 
parties because of a mutual mistake.”). 
 102. It is to this reasoning that, the dissent in the court of appeals decision 
argues: 
[I]f form is always put over substance, any remedy available for mutual 
mistake would be placed out of the reach of those who would otherwise 
be entitled to one.  A court should not abstain from applying mutual-
mistake analysis simply because the underlying transaction was for 
corporate stock rather than another kind of asset. 
SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 779 N.W.2d 
865, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (Worke, J., dissenting), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 
(Minn. 2011). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SCI DECISION 
Form-over-substance permeates the entire SCI decision.  In 
SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court began its reasoning on the right 
track by expressly refusing to apply “the additional analysis from 
Costello, which focuses on the form . . . of the transaction”103 outside 
the realm of the rescission of stock sale agreements.  Moreover, the 
supreme court properly invoked the traditional elements of 
contract reformation from prior Minnesota cases.  Notwithstanding 
this express rejection of a bright-line focus on form in the context 
of the reformation of a stock sale agreement, however, the supreme 
court proceeded to apply these traditional elements of reformation 
by simply reverting back to a bright-line focus on form.  The court 
accomplished this complete contradiction by applying the elements 
of reformation from the perspective of a corporation’s separate 
and distinct legal status.  The court did this in such a manner as to 
ensure that, as a matter of law, virtually no stock sale agreements 
can be reformed for mutual mistake. 
Strangely, nowhere in SCI does the supreme court comment 
on this rather obvious reversion to a bright-line focus on corporate 
form and the striking similarity of the rules it fashioned in SCI with 
the bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello.  The dissent in 
SCI at the Minnesota Court of Appeals was quite prescient to 
remark that “if form is always put over substance, any remedy 
available for mutual mistake would be placed out of . . . reach,"104 
because of the contradictory reasoning of the supreme court and 
the court's reversion to a bright-line focus on corporate form. 
The analysis that follows is divided into four parts, each of 
which illustrates in greater detail the supreme court’s confused and 
contradictory reasoning in SCI.  First, the analysis evaluates how 
prior Minnesota case law illustrates the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
fractured and confusing approach to looking through the 
corporate form where mutual mistake taints a stock sale 
agreement.105  Second, the analysis scrutinizes the supreme court’s 
focus on the corporate form as the subject matter of a stock sale 
agreement to bolster its reasoning in SCI under the second 
 
 103. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Costello v. Sykes, 143 
Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919)). 
 104. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 779 N.W.2d at 878 (Worke, J., dissenting); see also 
Garrey v. Nelson, 185 Minn. 487, 489, 242 N.W. 12, 13 (1932) (“In equity the court 
adapts its relief to exigencies of the case in hand, and in so doing form always gives 
way to substance.”). 
 105. See infra Part IV.A. 
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traditional element for reformation.106  This section of the analysis 
compares and contrasts the supreme court’s approach in SCI with 
another area where Minnesota courts routinely look beyond the 
corporate form when determining whether to exercise their 
equitable powers: piercing the corporate veil.  Third, the analysis 
dissects the supreme court’s reliance in SCI on bright-line and 
form-focused principles of corporate and agency law to 
constructively impute to a corporate stock seller knowledge that 
guarantees a unilateral mistake under the third traditional element 
for reformation.107  This section of the analysis compares and 
contrasts the supreme court’s approach in SCI with the more 
nuanced approach of prior Minnesota case law to constructive 
knowledge where the relief sought is equitable.  Finally, the analysis 
argues that SCI was probably a result-oriented decision.108 
A. Minnesota’s Fractured and Confusing History of Looking Through the 
Corporate Form for Mistake 
Four years before its holding in Costello, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided Drake v. Fairmont Drain Tile & Brick Co.,109 
another case involving a stock sale agreement.  In Drake, the 
plaintiff contracted to buy shares of stock in a corporation involved 
in the manufacture of clay drain tiles.110  The plaintiff was induced 
to purchase the stock by the defendant seller’s representations 
about a clay deposit on land owned by the corporation.111  When 
the parties entered into the stock sale agreement, they both 
believed that the clay deposit was of a quality high enough to be 
used in the manufacture of drain tiles.112  Several months after the 
plaintiff paid for the stock, both parties discovered that the clay 
deposit was not of the quality required for drain tiles.113  The 
plaintiff sued for rescission of the stock sale agreement.114  The 
supreme court rescinded the agreement, concluding that both 
parties, innocent of the identical belief regarding the quality of the 
clay deposit, “were mutually mistaken upon the very same essentials 
 
 106. See infra Part IV.B. 
 107. See infra Part IV.C. 
 108. See infra Part IV.D. 
 109. 129 Minn. 145, 151 N.W. 914 (1915). 
 110. Id. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915. 
 111. Id. at 146–47, 151 N.W. at 915. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915. 
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of the contract.”115  The supreme court’s view of mistake in Drake is 
consistent with section 151 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts which states that “mistake is a belief that is not in accord 
with the facts.”116 
In Drake, the supreme court rescinded the stock sale 
agreement due to the parties’ mutual mistake about the assets of 
the corporation whose stock was the subject matter of the 
agreement.  Four years later in Costello, however, the supreme court 
abruptly refused to look for the parties’ actual agreement because 
the court thought it to be beyond the “identity or existence” of the 
corporate stock being sold.117  The supreme court found in both 
Drake and Costello that the parties to the stock sale agreements were 
mutually mistaken about corporate assets.118  Nevertheless, the 
supreme court reasoned quite differently between the two cases, 
reaching opposite results.  Quite remarkably, Costello neither 
distinguished nor specifically overruled Drake.  Costello, in fact, 
never even mentioned Drake.  The question arises, therefore, 
whether these cases may be reconciled, or whether Costello, having 
been decided later, implicitly overruled Drake.   
In both Drake and Costello, the parties negotiated for corporate 
assets about which they were mutually mistaken.119  In both cases 
the buyer, rather than the seller, was the party seeking equitable 
relief.  No material differences are evident between the two cases.  
Whether or not Drake and Costello can be reconciled, the supreme 
court explained in SCI that stare decisis required it to follow the 
reasoning in Costello for the rescission of stock sale agreements.  
 
 115. Id. at 150–51, 151 N.W. at 916. 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981). 
 117. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919).  
 118. Id. at 111, 172 N.W. at 908 (“The parties to the sale were mutually 
mistaken as to the assets of the bank, the actual value and the book value of its 
stock, and the amount of its surplus and undivided profits.”); Drake, 129 Minn. at 
150, 151 N.W. at 917 (“Both [parties] acted upon a supposed state of facts which 
did not exist.  They were mutually mistaken upon the very same essentials of the 
contract.  The mind of neither met upon an actual existing condition or state of 
facts.”). 
 119. We are told that the parties in Drake spoke specifically about the quality of 
the corporate asset about which they were later found to be mutually mistaken.  
Drake, 129 Minn. at 146, 151 N.W. at 915.  In fact, the buyer and the seller 
probably negotiated about it.  Moreover, we are not told that the parties in Costello 
ever spoke specifically about the quality of the assets in the corporation, with 
which the corporation’s employees had secretly absconded.  Presumably they did, 
however, because the court found that the buyer bought ten shares for $136 per 
share because the books and records of the corporation showed that each share of 
stock was worth $136.  Costello, 143 Minn. at 110, 172 N.W. at 908. 
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Accordingly, it should be safe to assume that, after SCI, the rule 
from Drake regarding rescission has now been implicitly overruled.  
The bright-line and form-focused rule from Costello applies to the 
rescission of stock sale agreements.  That said, however, why 
doesn’t the concept survive from Drake that a court should look 
beyond the mere identity or existence of a corporation’s stock and 
into the essence of the parties’ transaction where the relief sought 
is not rescission but reformation?  In fact, this concept clearly 
should survive in light of the following statement made by the 
supreme court in SCI that bright-line and form-focused reasoning 
should not be used when a Minnesota court weighs whether or not 
to reform a written contractual agreement: 
When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the 
additional analysis from Costello, which focuses on the 
form or subject matter of the transaction that the [party] 
seeks to undo (i.e., a stock sale), applies. But we have never 
used that additional analysis in the reformation context, where 
the relief does not seek to unwind the transaction but 
simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention.  
We likewise decline to do so here.120 
Initially, the supreme court charted the proper course in SCI by 
invoking the traditional elements of reformation espoused by prior 
Minnesota case law.  Shortly after invoking this precedent, however, 
the supreme court’s reasoning careened back toward that which it 
had just expressly rejected—Costello.  The court became hopelessly 
and unfortunately ensnared in a bright-line focus on formal 
principles that view a corporation as a formally separate and 
distinct entity. 
After assuming that the first traditional element for 
reformation had been met—that the parties had an actual 
agreement—the supreme court proceeded to reason about both 
the second and third elements traditionally required for 
reformation.  It was here that the supreme court was apprehended 
by these principles of corporate and agency law. 
 
 120. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 865 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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B. The Second Element for Reformation: Focus on Corporate Form 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Rejection and Resurrection of 
Costello’s Reasoning 
Under Minnesota law, the second traditional element that a 
party must prove when seeking to reform a written contractual 
agreement is that the written agreement fails to express the 
objectively manifested intentions of the parties.121  In SCI, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the stock sale agreement 
reflected the true intentions of the parties “[b]ecause SCI had the 
right to exclude the vacant lots under the plain terms of the stock 
sale agreement, as a matter of law . . . .”122  Notably, the court 
buttresses its conclusion that the stock sale agreement reflected the 
true intentions of the parties with the phrase “as a matter of law.”  
This phrase is, presumably, a direct reference to the court’s true 
reasoning—its application of Minnesota corporate law, which 
immediately precedes this conclusion. 
In the several sentences immediately preceding its conclusion 
that the stock sale agreement in SCI reflected the true intentions of 
the parties, the supreme court expounded upon the effect of 
Minnesota corporate law on the transfer of assets and liabilities in a 
stock sale.123  In particular, the court pointed out that the stock sale 
agreement reflected the true intentions of the parties because 
“under Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers all of its stock, 
it is selling all of its assets and liabilities unless the business has expressed 
otherwise.”124  This reasoning merely refocused the court on the 
form or subject matter of the agreement—a stock sale.  Moreover, 
this reasoning led to the court’s conclusion that the second 
traditional element for reformation was not met.  In contrast to this 
reasoning, and only five brief paragraphs earlier in the SCI 
decision, the supreme court stated unequivocally that “the 
additional analysis from Costello . . . focuses on the form or subject matter 
of the transaction that the [party] seeks to undo (i.e., a stock sale).  
But we have never used that additional analysis in the reformation 
context . . . .”125  Yet, like a phoenix from the ashes, the supreme 
court uses principles of Minnesota corporate law to resurrect the 
 
 121. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980) 
(referring to the “real intentions” of the parties). 
 122. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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essential bright-line and form-focused reasoning from Costello in the 
context of reformation. 
This reversion to a bright-line focus on form is further 
revealed by the supreme court’s characterization of the district 
court’s analysis regarding rescission, affirmed by both the court of 
appeals and the supreme court: “The [district] court, relying on 
Costello v. Sykes . . . held that appellants were not entitled to 
rescission based on mutual mistake because a stock sale transfers all 
assets and liabilities unless specifically excluded.”126  This language, used 
by the supreme court to explain how the district court applied 
Costello in the rescission context, is nearly indistinguishable from 
the language used by the supreme court to buttress its conclusion 
that the second traditional element for reformation was not met.127  
Simply stated, in SCI, the supreme court used the identical 
reasoning to prevent relief through reformation that Costello used 
to prevent relief through rescission—namely, that under Minnesota 
law, a stock sale transfers all assets and liabilities not specifically 
excluded by the parties’ agreement.  This reasoning directly 
contradicts the supreme court’s express disavowal of Costello in the 
reformation context.  As a result, after SCI, the mode of analysis for 
equitable relief in the context of a stock sale agreement is 
essentially the same in Minnesota regardless of whether the relief 
sought is rescission or reformation.  If this is the state of affairs that 
the supreme court was aiming to achieve through SCI, the law in 
Minnesota would have been made much more simple if the 
supreme court had merely affirmed the court of appeals’ extension 
of Costello to reformation.  Extending Costello to reformation would 
have yielded the same result as that from SCI because both modes 
of analysis preclude relief for the same reason: Minnesota courts 
will not look through the corporate form when determining 
whether to exercise their equitable powers of reformation, absent 
fraud or inequitable conduct.  The supreme court’s holding in SCI 
is, therefore, rooted directly within that which it had also ostensibly 
rejected: bright-line and form-focused principles of corporate 
law.128 
 
 126. Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
 127. See id. at 866 (“[U]nder Minnesota law, when a business sells and transfers all 
of its stock, it is selling all of its assets and liabilities unless the business has expressed 
otherwise.”) (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 865 (“When the relief seeks to void the entire contract, the 
additional analysis from Costello, which focuses on the form or subject matter of 
the transaction that the [party] seeks to undue (i.e., a stock sale), applies.”). 
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The corporate form is not, however, impermeable to equity’s 
purview.  Courts in Minnesota have long looked through the 
corporate form when determining whether to exercise their 
equitable powers.129  Specifically, Minnesota courts are regularly 
called upon to look through the corporate form and to the facts 
and circumstances within the corporation in order to determine 
whether to use their equitable powers to impose liability on 
shareholders for corporate obligations.  This judicial practice is 
referred to as determining whether to “pierce the corporate veil.”130  
Analogizing to this judicial practice is useful to question the lengths 
to which the supreme court goes in SCI to keep from looking 
through the corporate form where the relief sought was equitable. 
2. Looking Through the Corporate Form To Determine Whether To 
Exercise Equitable Powers: Piercing the Corporate Veil 
A mainstay principle of corporate law is that the owners of a 
corporation, generally called “shareholders,” are not liable for the 
debts or obligations of the corporation.131  A corollary to this 
principle is that a corporation is an entity formally separate and 
distinct from its shareholders.132  These two concepts are, in fact, 
two sides of a single coin: the policy of limited shareholder liability 
is a fundamental reason why a corporation is considered to be an 
entity formally separate and distinct from its shareholders.133  Any 
 
 129. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 
154, 157–58, 264 N.W. 576, 578 (1936) (indicating that a court will disregard a 
corporation’s separate fictional legal existence where continuing regard of the 
corporate form would advance fraud or inequity). 
 130. See Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., LLC, 736 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 
2007) (“A court may pierce the corporate veil to hold a shareholder liable for the 
debts of the corporation . . . .”). 
 131. 4 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 1556 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2010) (“Today, corporation statutes in 
all jurisdictions provide that shareholders are not liable to the corporation or its 
creditors except to the extent of any unpaid consideration for their shares, unless 
the shareholder becomes personally liable by reason of the shareholder’s acts or 
conduct.”). 
 132. Id. § 25. 
 133. See 114 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Establishing Elements for Disregarding 
Corporate Entity and Piercing Entity’s Veil § 403 (2011) (“A fundamental principle of 
Anglo-American law is that a [corporation] . . . is separate and distinct from its 
owners . . . . Consequently, the liability of an [owner] for the obligations of an 
entity is limited to [the owner’s] interest in the entity.  This concept of limited 
liability has been called the most attractive feature of [the] corporation.”) 
(emphasis added); John H. Matheson, The Limits of Business Limited Liability: Entity 
Veil Piercing and Successor Liability Doctrines, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 411, 413 
(2004) (“Businesses and their owners regularly seek to limit the scope of their 
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effort, therefore, by a court applying equitable principles to impose 
corporate liabilities on the shareholders of the corporation is in 
derogation of the fundamental principle of corporate law that a 
corporation is separate and distinct from its shareholders. 
We find, nonetheless, that courts do look through the separate 
and distinct status of a corporation when called upon to determine 
whether to exercise their equitable powers and impose corporate 
liabilities on shareholders.134  When a court does exercise its 
equitable powers to impose corporate liabilities on shareholders, 
the court is said to be “piercing the corporate veil.”135  In order to 
actually pierce the veil and impose liability, however, particular 
circumstances must exist: either fraud must be present or the 
corporation must be merely an alter ego of its shareholders.136  
Minnesota courts will look through the corporate form to 
determine whether to pierce the corporate veil regardless of 
whether fraud is involved.137  Notably, fraud is not a necessary 
element to pierce the corporate veil where the shareholders have 
used the corporation as their alter ego.138  In the absence of fraud, 
however, Minnesota courts require that “some element of injustice 
or fundamental unfairness” would result if the corporate veil were 
not pierced.139  It is true that in circumstances where Minnesota 
courts will pierce the corporate veil in the absence of fraud, the 
corporate shareholders have generally tried to have their cake and 
eat it too.140  Nevertheless, this practice illustrates that Minnesota 
 
liabilities . . . . There are two distinct ways in which these business liabilities may be 
limited.  First, entrepreneurs may take advantage of various state laws to create 
some form of limited liability entity under which the business will operate.  These 
entities, such as traditional corporations . . . have a legal existence separate from 
the owner of the business and presumptively shield the owner from personal 
obligation for the business debts.  In the business context, this might be referred 
to as ‘entity-based limited liability.’”). 
 134. See Roepke v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. 1981) 
(explaining that the concept of piercing the corporate veil involves ignoring the 
corporation as a “distinct entity” and is a concept “equitable in nature”). 
 135. Piercing the corporate veil is a judicially created exception to a 
corporation’s separate and distinct existence, created through the court’s equity 
powers.  FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5.1, at 69 (2d ed. 2010). 
 136. Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 
1979). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (“[W]e have never explicitly held that fraud is a necessary element.”). 
 139. Id. (“[In the absence of fraud,] there [must] be an element of injustice or 
fundamental unfairness.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Mfrs. Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825, 
827 (1975) (holding that piercing the corporate veil was appropriate in the 
absence of fraud where the corporation was used by the shareholders as merely a 
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courts regularly and unhesitatingly look through the corporate 
form in order to determine whether to exercise their equitable 
powers. 
3. Not Looking Through the Corporate Form To Determine Whether 
To Exercise Equitable Powers: SCI’s Approach To Reformation 
If Minnesota courts will, even in the absence of fraud, look 
through a corporation’s formally separate and distinct status when 
determining whether they will exercise their equitable powers to 
impose corporate liabilities on shareholders, why did the supreme 
court in SCI refuse to look through the corporate form when 
determining whether to exercise its equitable powers of 
reformation?  Why, in light of the fact that the parties in SCI 
stipulated to agreed-upon facts that exuded injustice and 
fundamental unfairness, did the court in SCI summarily take refuge 
in bright-line legal principles rooted in a corporation’s formally 
separate and distinct status?   
Unfortunately, the supreme court failed in SCI to provide any 
deeper reasoning with which to answer these questions.  It failed to 
offer any rationale for its patent application of these bright-line and 
form-focused principles.  An unstated reason may be provided by 
the supreme court in Costello.  There, the supreme court stated that 
it would not disregard a corporation’s formally separate status 
when determining whether to exercise its equitable powers of 
rescission because the court was not “inclined to open up a new 
field for litigation.”141  In light of the preceding discussion of 
piercing the corporate veil, this rationale from Costello has merit 
because the issue of piercing the corporate veil is “one of the most 
frequently litigated in all of corporate law.”142  It is an area “all too 
often characterized by ambiguity, unpredictability, and . . . 
randomness,”143 which stems from the unpredictable application 
and inconsistent articulation of the rules applicable to the practice 
of looking through the corporate form to determine whether to 
pierce the corporate veil.  If the supreme court feared opening up 
 
convenient depository and conduit for holding rental property).  
 141. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 113, 172 N.W. 907, 909 (1919). 
 142. Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” 
“Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited 
Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 405, 411 (2006). 
 143. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 507 
(2001). 
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a new field for litigation in SCI by looking through the corporate 
form in order to determine whether to exercise its equitable 
powers of reformation, the court’s fear would be quite justified.  
The supreme court never offers this as a rationale in SCI, however.  
Moreover, the fact that the supreme court goes out of its way to 
expressly reject the bright-line and form-focused reasoning from 
Costello, where the relief sought is reformation, strongly suggests 
that this is not the rationale underlying the court’s holding in SCI.  
If the supreme court had truly feared creating a new breeding 
ground for litigation through its decision in SCI, the court would 
have more effectively prevented such a possibility by simply 
affirming the court of appeals’ extension of the rule from Costello to 
the reformation of stock sale agreements.144 
The confused approach of SCI renders the supreme court’s 
express rejection of Costello in the reformation context effectively 
superfluous.  As such, SCI’s approach invites future litigation.  This 
is evident by comparing the mode of analysis used in Costello with 
that used in SCI.  Costello’s mode of analysis is simple and 
straightforward.  It occurs all in one step: no equitable relief is 
allowed for a stock sale agreement, absent fraud or inequitable 
conduct, because the subject matter being sold is stock.145  SCI’s 
mode of analysis, on the other hand, is vague and internally 
contradictory.  It occurs in at least two steps: first, the traditional 
elements of reformation are applied and then formal principles of 
corporate and agency law are applied.146  This approach provides a 
breeding ground for litigation.  Future mistaken parties to stock 
sale agreements will doubtlessly litigate in order to show that their 
facts are somehow different from those of SCI.  Perhaps the 
unintended transfer of liabilities, rather than assets, will be at issue 
in future cases.  In addition, buyers, rather than sellers, may be the 
parties seeking relief.  Moreover, mistaken parties to an 
unincorporated business sale agreement, such as an agreement to 
sell a limited liability company, may litigate whether SCI’s bright-
line and form-focused reasoning extends to unincorporated 
business entities.  Finally, future mistaken parties to stock sale 
agreements will be forced to litigate in order to clarify the true 
import of the vague and internally contradictory reasoning in SCI. 
 
 144. See SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 
779 N.W.2d 865, 871–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 145. See Costello, 143 Minn. at 114, 172 N.W. at 909. 
 146. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 865–67 (Minn. 2011). 
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C. The Third Element for Reformation: When Constructive Knowledge 
Leads To Unilateral Mistake 
1. Minnesota’s Nuanced Approach To Constructive Knowledge 
where Equitable Relief Is Sought 
Under Minnesota case law, the third element that a party must 
prove when seeking to reform a written contractual agreement is 
that the written agreement’s failure to express the true intentions 
of the parties is the result of a mutual mistake—a mistake of both 
parties to the agreement.147  In SCI, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
concluded that any mistake made regarding the two properties was 
unilateral, rather than mutual, because “it was SCI that failed to 
remove the lots from the transaction.”148  The court explained that 
it was again using Minnesota corporate law to anchor its reasoning, 
concluding that “under general corporate law principles, a 
corporation is charged with constructive knowledge . . . of all 
material facts”149 of which its agents have knowledge.  The court 
also rationalized that because some SCI employees had, at some 
point in the past, known about the two properties, Minnesota law 
thereby imputed those employees’ knowledge to “the entire 
company.”150  It is true that the law of agency imputes knowledge 
from an agent, such as an employee, to the principal, such as the 
employer.151  Moreover, a corporate agent’s knowledge can be 
imputed to the corporation collectively with the knowledge of 
other corporate agents.152  The supreme court’s enthusiasm in SCI 
for these formal principles of corporate and agency law is 
misplaced, however, in light of the court’s complete failure to 
grapple with the more nuanced approach that Minnesota case law 
has taken to constructive knowledge where the relief sought is 
equitable. 
 
 147. E.g., Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980). 
 148. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866. 
 149. Id. at 866 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply 
Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 895–96 (Minn. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 150. Id. 
 151. A major consequence of a corporation’s separate and distinct status is 
that a corporation can act only through its agents, such as employees or directors 
of the corporation.  See Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 
309 (Minn. 2005) (“[A] corporation is an artificial entity which can only act 
through agents.” (quoting Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753, 
754 (Minn. 1992))) (emphasis added).  As a result, the law of agency applies to 
govern the relations between and among a corporation, its agents, and third 
parties. 
 152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. c (2006). 
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In Gartner v. Eikill,153 the Minnesota Supreme Court explained 
that “[t]he failure of a party to investigate” will not always result in 
a unilateral mistake precluding equitable relief.154  The court in 
Gartner took a nuanced approach to how parties to an agreement 
bear the risk of their lack of knowledge or their failure to obtain 
knowledge through adequate investigation.  There, the supreme 
court held that the parties to a commercial real estate transaction 
were mutually mistaken where they both believed the land being 
sold was zoned for general commercial use.155  The purchaser 
undertook some investigation of the land’s zoning status but 
somehow failed to discover that it was not zoned as both parties 
understood it to be zoned.156  In Gartner, the supreme court 
expressly rejected the defendant-respondent’s invitation to 
constructively impute knowledge of the land’s true zoning status to 
the plaintiff-appellant.157  Moreover, the court based its reasoning 
on prior Minnesota case law158 as well as on the California Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Hannah v. Steinman,159 a case in which all 
parties to a lease were unaware of a local leasehold ordinance.  In 
Hannah, the parties could have discovered the ordinance if they 
had inquired with the city.160  Similarly, the court in Gartner 
reasoned that the parties’ lack of knowledge was a mutual mistake, 
noting that “‘[w]e cannot believe that the equitable rules relative to 
mistake should be so narrowly construed as to require us to hold 
that this mistake did not go to the very essence of the contract 
between these parties.’”161 
2. SCI’s Disregard of Minnesota’s Nuanced Approach To 
Constructive Knowledge 
In SCI, the facts are devoid of any indication that SCI 
undertook a search for all properties titled to Crystal Lake prior to 
 
 153. 319 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1982). 
 154. Id. at 399 (“The failure of a party to investigate, however, will not always 
preclude rescission.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 508 (1932))). 
 155. Id. at 400. 
 156. Id. at 398. 
 157. Id. at 399–400. 
 158. Id. at 399 (“In Lindquist v. Gibbs, 122 Minn. 205, 142 N.W. 156 (1913), and 
Thwing v. Hall & Ducey Lumber Co., 40 Minn. 184, 41 N.W. 815 (1889), for 
example, this court ordered rescission of contracts for the sale of land under 
circumstances in which the buyer could have discovered the mistake.”). 
 159. 112 P. 1094 (Cal. 1911). 
 160. Id. at 1095. 
 161. Gartner, 319 N.W.2d at 400 (quoting Hannah, 112 P. at 1098). 
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the stock sale.  SCI may have failed to undertake any such 
investigation, whereas in Gartner the parties did undertake some 
investigation—just not enough to discover the mistake.  The 
supreme court’s holding in SCI fails to make this distinction 
between some diligence and no diligence, however.  Instead, the 
court simply imputes knowledge per se to SCI, stating that because 
“Minnesota law imputes . . . knowledge [of the two properties] to 
the entire company, SCI could have removed the vacant lots from 
the sale. . . . [T]herefore, any mistake was a unilateral mistake.”162  
Relying on the conclusion that any mistake regarding the two 
properties was made unilaterally by SCI because SCI bore the risk 
of the mistake, the supreme court barred SCI from obtaining 
equitable relief through reformation because the third traditional 
element for reformation could not be met.163  Under the third 
traditional element, a party seeking reformation cannot have made 
a unilateral mistake unless the other party knew about the mistake 
or acted fraudulently.164  Accordingly, the supreme court’s decision 
to ascribe knowledge of the properties to SCI, thereby saddling SCI 
with the risk of removing the properties before sale, is a departure 
from, as well as a complete failure to grapple with, Minnesota’s 
much more nuanced approach to constructive knowledge where 
the relief sought is equitable, as illustrated by Gartner.  Simply 
stated, this failure further illustrates how the supreme court in SCI 
effectively continued to adhere to the bright-line focus on form 
from Costello. 
Where a party to a stock sale agreement is seeking to reform 
that agreement, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in SCI will 
charge that party with knowledge—“as a matter of law”—of all 
assets and liabilities of which any agent of that party has or had 
knowledge while working in the scope of his or her agency 
duties.165  Therefore, sellers who have negotiated with a buyer for 
an exact mix of assets and liabilities to be sold through a stock sale 
agreement where any agent of the seller is or was aware of assets 
titled to the corporation to be sold that are not part of the sale 
agreement will almost never be able to obtain relief through 
reformation if that agreement is tainted with a mistake of both 
 
 162. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 866 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 163. Id. (“Any mistake here regarding the vacant lots was SCI’s mistake alone 
because it was SCI that failed to remove the lots from the transaction.”). 
 164. Nichols v. Shelard Nat’l Bank, 294 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Minn. 1980). 
 165. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 866. 
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parties as to the composition of assets and liabilities held by the 
corporation whose stock is being sold.  Instead, the seller will always 
be held to have made a unilateral mistake,166 precluding relief. 
D. The Effect of the SCI Decision: A Result-Oriented Decision? 
Perhaps the supreme court’s decision in SCI was result-
oriented.  After all, the court seemed to vacillate about what the 
“mistake” was in the case.167  When discussing rescission, the 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. On the other hand, the supreme court’s decision in SCI could be viewed, 
through the bent of certain legal scholarship, as policy-oriented.  Consider 
Duncan Kennedy’s discussion of the correlation between form and substance and 
rules and standards in the law.  In his article, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, Kennedy describes a school of legal thought justifying judicial 
decisions based on form rather than substance.  Duncan Kennedy, Forms and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).  Kennedy states 
that such decisions may result in “the imposition of liability on the actor who is not 
morally blameworthy.”  Id. at 1743.  “The basic notion behind these arguments” 
elevating formal rules over substance, writes Kennedy, is that “vigilance in one’s 
interests [is one of a number of] economic goods” whose production should be 
stimulated.  Id.   
The best way to stimulate their production is to sanction those who fail to 
acquire them, by exposing them to breach of altruistic duty by those who 
are more provident.  The rule advocate may affirm that “this hurts me 
more than it does you” as she administers the sanction. But the refusal to 
tolerate present inequity would make everyone worse off in the long run. 
Id.  As applied to the result in SCI, the argument for the application of this 
viewpoint would be that SCI should have undertaken whatever vigilance was 
necessary to ensure that it knew of every asset owned by Crystal Lake before the 
stock sale and that SCI will be bound to reap whatever may befall its failure to do 
so.  It seems likely that, if applied without restraint, this viewpoint would abrogate 
most, if not all, equitable remedies.  Roscoe Pound advocated for a somewhat 
restrained application of this viewpoint, stating that “legal conceptions which are 
applied mechanically are more adapted to property and to business transactions; 
standards where application proceeds upon intuition are more adapted to human 
conduct and to the conduct of enterprises.”  Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial 
Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923).  Unfortunately, aside from a vague 
appeal to common sense, Pound fails to illustrate why his stated distinction is 
normative.  Kennedy, for his part, suggests that an attempt might be made to 
balance form and substance in the law by researching “at the level of social reality. 
. . . the actual influence of [decisions based on form and decisions based on 
substance] on economic, social, and political life.”  Duncan Kennedy, supra at 
1738.  Kennedy’s suggestion is, however, utterly indistinct from an articulation of 
the basic reasons for and policies behind the historical development of equitable 
remedies.  As such, this legal scholarship collapses into traditional notions of 
equity and the law, such as that so famously described by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.: “The distinctions of the law are founded on experience, not on logic.  
It therefore does not make the dealings of men dependent on a mathematical 
accuracy.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 244 (Mark DeWolfe Howe 
ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
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mistake related to the value of the Crystal Lake stock.168  When 
discussing reformation, however, the mistake morphed and 
became SCI’s failure to remove the two properties from Crystal 
Lake before the stock sale.169  The rationale behind this 
equivocation is never explained.170  In all likelihood, the supreme 
court was concerned that the mistake in SCI was one of value.  For 
reasons of efficiency and utility, equitable remedies cannot reach 
mutual mistakes of value.  Lord Henry Home Kames explained that 
“[t]o indulge debate about the true value of every commercial 
subject, would destroy commerce; and, for that reason, equity, 
which has nothing in view but the interest of a single person, must 
yield to utility, which regards the whole society.”171  Yet, it seems 
plausible that the mistake in SCI is more realistically characterized 
not as one of value but as the failure of the written agreement to 
reflect the parties’ undisputed bargain for the cemeteries and 
funeral home businesses, not the vacant lots.  Viewed this way, the 
mistake would qualify for equitable relief through reformation, if 
the supreme court had truly put aside Costello’s bright-line focus on 
form in the reformation context. 
Indeed, in SCI, the supreme court itself admits that 
reformation should be easier to achieve than rescission because 
“reformation . . . does not seek to unwind the transaction but 
simply to modify it to reflect the parties’ actual intention.”172  
Consequently, the court should have followed its own advice and 
fashioned a rule that allows Minnesota courts to look through the 
corporate form when determining whether to reform stock sales 
agreements because “[a] legal conclusion which is sound for one 
purpose may be unrealistic . . . when applied to a different though 
related purpose.”173  In this too, the supreme court strayed from its 
 
 168. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 862. 
 169. Id. at 866. 
 170. Pound, supra note 167, at 941 (“Having to decide so many cases and to 
write so many opinions, either consideration of the merits of the actual 
controversy must yield to the need of detailed formulation of a precedent that will 
not embarrass future decision, or careful formulation must give way to the 
demand for study of the merits of the case in hand. . . . [T]oo often both these 
things happen and the case itself is not as well considered as the court could wish, 
while much is said in deciding it which must be re-examined as well as may be 
when cited to the court in other controversies.”).  But see LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN 
WONDERLAND 72 (North-South Books 1999) (1866) (“Take care of the sense, and 
the sounds will take care of themselves.”). 
 171. KAMES, supra note 18, at 176. 
 172. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., 795 N.W.2d at 865. 
 173. Minn. Odd Fellows Home v. Pogue, 245 Minn. 539, 544, 73 N.W.2d 615, 
619 (1955). 
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own declaration that “[i]n equity the court adapts its relief to 
exigencies of the case in hand, and in so doing form always gives 
way to substance.”174 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since Costello, Minnesota has refused to look beyond the 
form—the corporate form—of stock sale agreements to rescind 
such agreements tainted with mutual mistake.  SCI provided the 
Minnesota Supreme Court with the opportunity to follow its own 
mandate that “[e]quity’s vision is not circumscribed by formal 
instruments, but extends through matters of form to the heart of 
the transaction.”175  Yet, despite the supreme court’s express 
limitation of Costello’s focus on form solely to actions for rescission, 
the supreme court failed in SCI to leave open any avenue of 
meaningful equitable relief for mutual mistake through 
reformation.  Instead, the supreme court refused to look for 
mutual mistake beyond the corporate form.  The supreme court 
supported this refusal with principles of corporate law—the same 
principles of corporate law that support Costello.  Moreover, the 
supreme court charged the corporate form, as a matter of law, with 
knowledge sufficient to guarantee a unilateral mistake that will 
nearly always preclude the reformation of stock sale agreements. 
The supreme court’s focus on the form of a stock sale 
agreement where the parties are seeking equitable relief is at odds 
with the court’s express rejection of Costello in the reformation 
context, as well as with longstanding judicial principles of equity.  
SCI effectively forecloses any meaningful equitable relief for stock 
sale agreements tainted with mutual mistake, leaving purchasers 
and sellers of stock helpless. 
 
 
 174. Garrey v. Nelson, 185 Minn. 487, 489, 242 N.W. 12, 13 (1932). 
 175. Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 267, 139 N.W. 493, 495 (1913). 
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